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ESSAY




Trans 2 employees can experience subtle forms of
workplace discrimination. Seemingly neutral or natural
policies and practices sometimes reflect discriminatory
attitudes and create unwelcoming or even hostile work
environments for trans employees. Fortunately, courts have
recently begun to recognize that discrimination against
trans employees constitutes discrimination based on sex in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984. 3 Yet,
despite increased protections for trans workers, subtle
forms of discrimination, if not acknowledged by courts or
addressed by employers, may erode employment
opportunities for trans communities.
The way in which federal courts have interpreted
the word "sex" in Title VII has changed significantly since
Congress passed the anti-discrimination statute. Initially,
federal courts limited "sex discrimination" to
discrimination based on "biological sex." 4  In 1989,
1 J.D. 2009, Temple University Beasley School of Law. The author
would like to thank Nancy Knauer, Katrina C. Rose, and Dean Spade
for reviewing earlier drafts.
2 Trans people are people who identify or express their gender in a way
that is different from that associated with their assigned sex at birth.
See Julia Serano, Whipping Girl FAQ on Cissexual, Cisgender, and Cis
Privilege (May 2009), http://juliaserano.livejournal.com/14700.htmi
(last visited Dec. 11, 2009).
3 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006).
4 See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.
1984) (construing "sex" in Title VII to refer to "biological sex").
1
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however, the United States Supreme Court held in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins5 that "sex discrimination" includes
discrimination based on sex stereotypes or gender non-
conformity.
6
In the last decade, federal courts-relying primarily
on the Price Waterhouse decision-have held that trans
employees who experience discrimination based on gender
identity or gender non-conformity can establish the prima
facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII. 7 In Part II
of this article, I briefly discuss the federal cases in which
trans plaintiffs successfully asserted sex discrimination
claims. Though trans employees lack trans-specific
workplace protections in many, if not most, jurisdictions,
federal courts increasingly find that trans employees can
establish the prima facie case of sex discrimination under
Title VII.
Nonetheless, a trans employee's ability to establish
the prima facie case does not guarantee the employee relief
under Title VII, even where the evidence strongly suggests
that the employee experienced discrimination because he or
she is trans. Once an employee establishes the prima facie
case, the court gives the employer an opportunity to
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its
decision to take adverse employment action against the
employee. For example, the employer might assert that it
discharged a female employee not because she is a woman,
but because she talked on the phone too much during the
workday.
Interestingly, in Title VII cases with trans plaintiffs,
the employer often asserts a "legitimate, non-
' 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
6 See Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing sex stereotyping theory described in Price
Waterhouse).
7 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004);
Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 2005); Schroer
v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008).
2
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discriminatory" reason related to gender, the plaintiff's
protected characteristic. For example, in Lopez v. River
Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., the defendant
employer stated that it discharged the plaintiff, a trans
woman, because she "misrepresented" herself as female
during her interview.8 In Part III of this article, I examine
three so-called "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reasons
that employers have asserted in Title VII cases with trans
plaintiffs, including gender misrepresentation,
inappropriate conversations related to gender, and potential
liability for bathroom usage. I argue that the defendants in
these cases seek to undermine well-established employment
law principles to continue to lawfully discriminate against
trans people and that judicial acceptance of their asserted
reasons as legitimate and non-discriminatory would
significantly erode employment opportunities for trans
people.
In Part IV of this article, I further argue that the
reasons asserted by the employers actually constitute direct
evidence of discrimination because the reasons reflect the
employers' discriminatory attitudes toward trans people.
Finally, in Part V of this article, I encourage employers to
acknowledge that existing workplace practices and policies
may actually support bias and discrimination against trans
employees, and I suggest that employers use frameworks
applied in other anti-discrimination contexts to erase
discriminatory attitudes toward trans people and avoid
future liability.
II. The Prima Fade Case
Before the United States Supreme Court decided
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,9 the federal courts of appeals
8 Lopez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Group, Inc., 542 F. Supp.
2d 653, 658 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
9 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
3
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that considered the issue agreed: Title VII's sex
discrimination provision does not protect trans individuals
who experience employment discrimination based on
gender non-conformity or transsexual background.' 0 For
example, in 1984, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held, in Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., that courts
should narrowly construe the term "sex" in Title VII to
mean biological sex rather than gender or sexual identity. "
In Ulane, the plaintiff, a trans woman, was employed by
the defendant airline as a pilot for nearly ten years before
she began her gender transition from male to female. 12 She
was terminated after she returned to work dressed in female
attire following her sex reassignment surgery. 13 The court
held that the plaintiff in Ulane could not state a claim under
Title VII because she had not experienced discrimination
based on sex. 14 Her "biological sex" was male, and she had
not experienced discrimination based on her status as a
"biological" male. 15
Five years later, the way in which the federal courts
interpreted Title VII's sex discrimination provision changed
significantly when the Supreme Court decided Price
Waterhouse. The Court held that discrimination based on
gender non-conformity constitutes discrimination based on
sex in violation of Title VII. 17  The plaintiff in Price
Waterhouse, a cis woman,' 8 filed a Title VII claim after she
10 See Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir.
1977); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F2d 748, 750 (8th Cir.
1982); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir.
1984).
" Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084.
12 Id. at 1082-83.
13 Id. at 1083.
14 Id. at 1085.
15 id.
16 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
17 id.
18 Cis people are people who identify or express their gender in a way
that is similar to that which is traditionally associated with their
4
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was denied partnership at an accounting firm. 19 She argued
that the partners reacted negatively to her aggressive
personality only because she is a woman and that they
therefore based their decision to deny her partnership on
sex stereotypes. 20 One partner described her as "macho,"
and another stated that she "overcompensated for being a
woman."
21
After the firm's policy board reached its decision,
the plaintiff in Price Waterhouse discussed her candidacy
with the head partner, who advised her "to walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.,2 2 The Court held
that the defendant employer had violated Title VII's sex
discrimination prohibition. It stated:
We are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their
group, for . . . in forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
24women resulting from sex stereotypes.
Since the Supreme Court decided Price Waterhouse
nearly twenty years ago, a handful of trans individuals who
experienced employment discrimination successfully used
assigned sex at birth. See Julia Serano, Whipping Girl FAQ on
Cissexual, Cisgender, and Cis Privilege (May 2009),
http://juliaserano.livejournal.com/14700.html (last visited Dec. 11,
2009).
19 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232-33.
20 Id. at 235.
21 id.
22 id.
23 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 237.
24 Id. at 251 (internal citations omitted).
5
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the sex stereotyping theory to argue that Title VII's sex
discrimination provision prohibits discrimination against
25trans employees because they are trans. For example, the
plaintiff in Smith v. City of Salem, a trans woman, argued
that her employer discriminated against her because she
was a "biological male" who failed to conform to her
employer's sex stereotypes regarding men. 26
The plaintiff, J. Smith, was employed by the City of
Salem as a lieutenant in the fire department. Smith had
been employed by the fire department for nearly seven
years when she began changing her appearance to reflect
her female gender identity.8 Several co-workers
questioned Smith about her appearance, so she met with her
immediate supervisor to discuss her gender transition.29
Smith's immediate supervisor then met with superiors to
discuss Smith's gender transition and to determine whether
the fire department could terminate her employment.3 °
Smith was ultimately suspended and later filed suit under
Title VII, arguing that her employer discriminated against
her based on her gender non-conformity.
31
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
the fire department had violated Title VII by discriminating
against Smith based on her failure to conform to the sex
stereotypes associated with males.32 The court stated that
"sex stereotyping based on a person's gender non-
conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination,
irrespective of the cause of that behavior; a label, such as
'transsexual,' is not fatal to a sex discrimination claim
25 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 E3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008).
26 Smith, 378 F.3d at 571-72.




31 Id. at 571.
32 ld. at 575.
6
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where the victim has suffered discrimination because of his
or her gender non-conformity."
33
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
held that the term "sex" in Title VII "encompasses both
sex-that is, the biological differences between men and
women-and gender. Discrimination because one fails to
act in the way ex4Pected of a man or woman is forbidden
under Title VII." The plaintiff in Schwenk v. Hartford, a
trans woman, filed a suit under the Gender Motivated
Violence Act after a prison guard in an all-male Washington
state prison raped her.35 The court in Schwenk noted that
the Gender Motivated Violence Act parallels Title VII and
thus examined Title VII cases to determine whether the
plaintiff had experienced violence motivated by gender.
36
The court held that the violence Schwenk experienced was
motivated by her assumption of a feminine appearance and
thus was motivated by gender in violation of the Gender
Motivated Violence Act.
37
In the most recent trans-positive interpretation of
Title VII by a federal court, the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that Title VII's sex
discrimination provision prohibits discrimination against
33 Id.
34 Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics in
original).
31 Id. at 1193-94.
16 Id. at 1202.
37 Id. Similarly, when interpreting the sex discrimination provision of
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in Rosa v. Park West Park & Trust
Co., the First Circuit considered Title VII case law. 214 F.3d 213, 215-
16 (1st Cir. 2000). The court determined that under Price Waterhouse,
"stereotyped remarks [including statements about dressing more
'femininely'] can certainly be evidence that gender played a part" in the
defendant's decision. Id. at 216. The plaintiff in Rosa, a "biological
male," tried to apply for a bank loan wearing "traditionally feminine
attire," but a bank employee told him that he could not apply for the
loan until he changed clothes. Id. at 214.
7
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trans employees. 38 The plaintiff in Schroer v. Billington, a
trans woman named Diane Schroer, applied for a position
as a terrorism specialist with the Congressional Research
Service at the Library of Congress. 39 During her interview,
she presented as male, as she had not yet started the phase
of her gender transition where she would present as
female .4 0 She was well-qualified for the position with more
than twenty-five Jyears of military experience, 4' and she
received an offer.4 After she accepted, she asked the hiring
official to lunch to discuss her gender transition.
Following the lunch, the hiring official discussed Schroer's
transition with other hiring officials, and ultimately, the
Library of Congress decided not to hire her for the
position.44 Schroer filed a sex discrimination claim under
Title VII.
45
Schroer argued that the Library of Congress
discriminated against her because she failed to conform to
46its gender stereotypes. In other words, she argued that the
Library of Congress failed to hire her because its hiring
officials viewed her as a man who failed to conform to sex
stereotypes associated with men.47 Alternatively, Schroer
argued that the Library of Congress may have
discriminated against her because its hiring officials viewed
her as a woman who failed to conform to the stereotypes
associated with women.48 In other words, she may have
appeared too masculine for her employer to view her as a
38 Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
31 Id. at 295.
40 id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 296.
43 id.
44 Id. at 297-99.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 303-06.
47 Id. at 305.
48 id.
8
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"proper" female. Finally, Schroer also argued that the
Library of Congress discriminated against her because she
is a trans individual and that discrimination based on trans
history constitutes discrimination based on sex per se.49
The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia held that whether the plaintiff relied on a sex
stereotyping theory or a "sex discrimination per se" theory,
she had stated a claim in violation of Title VII.5 °
The Schroer court compared a change of sex to a
change of religion, noting that "[d]iscrimination 'because
of religion' easily encompasses discrimination because of a
change of religion." 5' The court stated:
Imagine that an employee is fired because she
converts from Christianity to Judaism. Imagine
too that her employer testifies that he harbors no
bias toward either Christians or Jews but only to
"converts."... No court would take seriously the
notion that 'converts' are not covered by the
statute.
52
Though trans workers are certainly not protected in
all jurisdictions, federal courts increasingly find that Title
VII does protect trans employees because the sex
discrimination provision encompasses gender identity or
expression discrimination. In this unsettled, yet
increasingly trans-inclusive, legal landscape, a trans
plaintiff who experiences employment discrimination
because she is trans can successfully establish a prima facie
case of sex discrimination in several jurisdictions.
49 Id. at 306. Schroer argued that gender identity is a component of
sex; thus, gender identity discrimination is sex discrimination. Id.
50 Id. at 308.
5' Id. at 306 (italics in original).
52 . ,
9
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III. "Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory" Reasons
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case,
the court offers the employer an opportunity to articulate a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff.53 However,
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons asserted by
employers in cases with trans plaintiffs typically relate to
the plaintiffs' gender identities or expressions. Judicial
acceptance of these reasons would erode employment
opportunities for trans people. Furthermore, employers that
assert these reasons in Title VII cases undermine well-
established employment law principles.
A. "Gender Misrepresentation"
In Lokez v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic
Group, Inc.,54 after the trans plaintiff established a prima
facie case of sex discrimination, the defendant employer
stated that the company rescinded its previous job offer to
the plaintiff because she "lied to the company when she
failed to disclose that she is biologically male, both to her
interviewers and on her resume and job application." 55 The
plaintiff in Lopez, a trans woman named Izza Lopez,
applied for a scheduler position with the defendant medical
56clinic. The defendant interviewed her for the position and
later offered her the job, subject to her successful
completion of a background check.57  However, the
defendant rescinded the job offer when Lopez's
background check results noted that she was, or had been
53 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)
(establishing the burden-shifting framework for Title VII cases).
54 542 E Supp. 2d 653 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
56 Id. at 658.
16 Id. at 655.
"7 Id. at 656.
10
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previously, classified as male. 58  The company's hiring
official sent Lopez a letter to confirm its decision to rescind
the offer.59 The letter stated: "As we previously explained
to you, our offer was rescinded because we believe you
misrepresented yourself to us during the interview process.
You presented yourself as a female and we later learned
you are a male."
60
Lopez filed a sex discrimination suit under Title VII
and, according to the District Court for the Southern
District of Texas, established a prima facie case of
employment discrimination based on the Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping theory.61 Thus, the burden of production
shifted to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its decision.62  However, the
defendant in Lopez argued that the company did not base its
decision to rescind Lopez's job offer on the plaintiff's sex
or her gender non-conformity.63  Rather, the defendant
argued that the company based its decision solely on its
belief that she had misrepresented herself during the
interview process. 64 The court held that it could not grant
summary judgment in either party's favor because it
remained unclear whether the company based its decision
on sex or sex stereotypes or whether the company based its
decision on its purportedly legitimate belief that Lopez
affirmatively misrepresented her sex during the hiring
process.
65
The defendant in Lopez seemed to argue that it
based its adverse employment decision on the plaintiff's




61 Id. at 660-61.
62 Id. at661.
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belief that trans individuals are necessarily deceptive.
However, the defendant's inability to explain the relevance
of the information and the significance of a
"misrepresentation" suggests that the defendant's asserted
reason is pretextual. Despite its assertion to the contrary,
the defendant in Lopez may have rescinded the plaintiff's
job offer based on a general view that trans people are
fraudulent or untrustworthy.66  Similarly, the defendant's
conduct in the recent Schroer case was at least partially
motivated by the employer's belief that trans individuals
are deceptive and thus untrustworthy.67  The defendant
employer in Schroer, the Library of Congress, argued that it
failed to hire the plaintiff, a trans woman, because, among
other things, it was concerned about her trustworthiness
given that she had not mentioned her gender transition at
the start of the interview process.68
The District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the defendant's concerns regarding the plaintiff's
trustworthiness were "pretextual. ' '69 The court stated that
the hiring official's "concern with Schroer's trustworthiness
66 Trans people have been accused of gender fraud in various contexts.
See, e.g., Transgender Politician Faces Fraud Lawsuit, Associated
Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2007, at A35 (discussing lawsuit filed
against a trans city council member by an unsuccessful political
opponent who claimed the trans woman misled voters by running for
office as a woman); Abigail Van Buren, Transsexual Owes Boyfriend
Truth, THE INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 7, 2007, at D7 (noting that failure to
discuss trans history with future husband could constitute fraud);
Husband' Sex-Change Subject of Appeal, Wife Says Marriage Was
Never Valid, Associated Press, LEXINGTON-HERALD LEADER, June 28,
2004, at B 1 (discussing cis woman's effort to annul her marriage after
her spouse transitioned from male to female based on the fact that "her
husband represented himself as a man when psychologically, he knew
all along he was a woman" and noting her argument that her spouse's
"failure to disclose his gender identity before the wedding constitutes 'a
fraud involving the essentials of marriage,").
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was belied by the fact that she thanked Schroer for her
honesty in the course of rescinding the job offer."7 The
Schroer court correctly determined that the defendant's
concerns regarding the plaintiff's trustworthiness were
"pretextual" in light of the particular factual circumstances
of the Schroer case.71 Unfortunately, the court failed to
hold that concerns about a trans individual's
trustworthiness due to a so-called misrepresentation
regarding his or her gender or due to a failure to disclose
trans background, gender identity, assigned sex, intent to
transition, or some combination of the aforementioned, are
facially discriminatory.
The Lopez court, however, went a little further than
the Schroer court, stating that "to the extent [the defendant
argues] that any person who dresses in a manner
inconsistent with traditional gender stereotypes is
necessarily deceptive, such a position is rejected."" Still,
the Lopez court's opinion left unresolved the question of
whether an affirmative "gender misrepresentation" on an
employment application or job interview could constitute a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to take adverse
employment action against a trans employee or applicant.
In fact, the court's opinion suggested that if the evidence in
the case proved that the plaintiff had affirmatively lied to
the company regarding her assigned sex, then the defendant
would not have violated Title VII when it rescinded the
plaintiff's job offer after it discovered her assigned sex.
73
The Lopez court's opinion largely ignores the reality that
any acceptance of gender misrepresentation as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason would not only severely cripple
a trans employee's ability to prevail under Title VII, but
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Lopez, 542 F Supp. 2d at 663.
73 d.
13
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would also have more immediate, practical consequences
for trans individuals seeking employment.
By recognizing so-called affirmative gender
misrepresentation as employee misconduct and thus
accepting it as a legitimate reason to take adverse action
against an employee, courts would effectively compel
(trans) applicants to reveal their assigned sex on
employment applications and to discuss their assigned sex
(and probably much more) in job interviews. To avoid
termination due to dishonesty or misrepresentation, trans
individuals would have to initiate irrelevant discussions
about their bodies and in some cases their medical histories.
Furthermore, where a trans applicant discloses or discusses
his or her assigned sex or gender presentation during the
hiring stage of the employment process, the applicant risks
the very real possibility that the employer's hiring official
will allow his or her prejudices to affect or undercut the
trans individual's employment opportunities.
Trans people who fail to disclose their assigned sex
on applications or during interviews, however, would
severely undermine any future employment discrimination
claims they might otherwise assert under Title VII. First,
upon discovering that an employee is trans, an employer
could lawfully discharge the employee even in a
jurisdiction in which a trans plaintiff can establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination. Second, an employer who
discharges an employee based on the employee's failure to
conform to sex stereotypes might argue that even though
the employer did not base its decision on the affirmative
gender misrepresentation, after-acquired evidence of
misconduct allows the employer to evade liability for its
discriminatory conduct. 74 This places trans workers in an
74 See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362
(1995):
The object of compensation is to restore the employee to the
position he or she would have been in absent the
14
6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 60
intolerable and impermissible Catch 22: immediate
exposure to discriminatory attitudes or erasure of Title VII
protection against future discriminatory attitudes.75
In essence, judicial acceptance of gender
misrepresentation as a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason to take adverse employment action against a trans
person totally erases Title VII protection for trans
employees in jurisdictions where the judiciary has
explicitly determined that Title VII protects trans people
against discrimination. In other words, trans people are in
the same unprotected position they were in prior to the
trans-positive Title VII decisions. Once an employer
discovers that an employee is trans, the employer may
lawfully opt to discharge the employee based on the
"misrepresentation," or the employer may opt to retain the
trans employee despite the "misrepresentation." Because
employers in jurisdictions that do not protect trans people
against discrimination possess the very same options, the
trans-positive rulings are rendered utterly meaningless.76
discrimination . but that principle is difficult to apply with
precision where there is after-acquired evidence of
wrongdoing that would have led to termination on legitimate
grounds had the employer known about it. Once an employer
learns about employee wrongdoing that would lead to a
legitimate discharge, we cannot require the employer to ignore
the information, even if it is acquired during the course of
discovery in a suit against the employer and even if the
information might have gone undiscovered absent the suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
75 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 ("An employer who objects
to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places
women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if
they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts
women out of this bind.").
76 Similarly, in applying anti-discrimination laws that expressly protect
trans employees, courts have determined that an employer may allow a
trans employee to use the restroom that reflects the employee's gender
identity and/or presentation; however, the employer is not legally
required to, for example, allow a trans woman to use the female-
15
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In addition to diminishing employment
opportunities for trans people, the assertion that gender
misrepresentation constitutes a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason to take adverse employment action
against a trans individual undercuts well-established
employment law principles regarding misrepresentations on
employment applications. In general, an employee's
misrepresentation constitutes misconduct only where
material to the duties of the positions sought. For example,
an individual's misrepresentation regarding alcoholism is
not material where the individual applies for a position as a
chef.77 Does an individual's "misrepresentation" regarding
gender constitute a material misrepresentation where the
individual, like the plaintiff in Lopez, applies for a position
as a scheduler? Is gender ever material to the duties of a
job in a society that has outlawed gender discrimination in
the workplace?
Title VII does permit discrimination based on
gender-and other protected characteristics-in very
limited circumstances. Section 703 of Title VII states that
"it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees.., on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business .. ,,78 One
might therefore argue that a misrepresentation regarding
designated restroom at work. Katrina C. Rose points out that anti-
discrimination laws are ineffective where the employer ultimately
retains sole discretion as to whether to permit a trans worker to use the
restroom that reflects his or her gender presentation. Katrina C. Rose,
Toilets, Transgendered People and the Law: The Minnesota
Microcosm and Beyond at 9 (2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
77 Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709 v. Hansen, 412 N.W.2d 320, 322-23 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1987).
78 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
16
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assigned sex is material only where assigned sex is a bona
fide occupational qualification. Courts have held that sex is
a bona fide occupational qualification in rare cases where
the employment of members of one sex would jeopardize
the safety of third parties 79 and where it would undermine
the essence of the business's operation. 80 Given that Title
VII limits the exception to these rare instances, sex or
gender certainly would not qualify as a bona fide
occupational qualification for the appointment scheduler
job; thus, a misrepresentation regarding assigned sex could
not be material to the duties of the job.
Furthermore, in Lopez, the defendant, as well as the
court, failed to distinguish between assigned sex and
"legal" sex (or sex as it is reflected on an individual's legal
identity documents). In the defendant's letter to Lopez, the
defendant stated: "As we previously explained to you, our
offer was rescinded because we believe you misrepresented
yourself to us during the interview process. You presented
yourself as a female and we later learned [through a
background check] you are a male." 81 The court's opinion
does not discuss whether the background check revealed
that Lopez's assigned sex was male or that Lopez's legal
identity documents classified her as male.82 Certainly, the
gender markers on the plaintiff's legal identity documents
may have matched her assigned sex. However, because
79 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977) (holding that
hiring exclusively male "correctional counselors in a 'contact' position
in an Alabama male maximum security penitentiary" was legal
discrimination pursuant to the "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception).
80 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.
1971) (hiring only female stewardesses is not legal discrimination
pursuant to the bona fide occupational qualification exception where
the essence or primary function of the business is the safe
transportation of passengers).
81 Lopez, 542 . Supp. 2d at 656 (internal citations omitted).
82 See generally id.
17
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many state agencies permit gender reclassification, an
individual's legal identity documents need not reflect the
individual's assigned birth sex.
83
In the United States, various agencies issue identity
documents with gender markers, including state
departments of health that issue birth certificates, state
departments of motor vehicles that issue drivers' licenses,
and the Social Security Administration ("SSA") that issues
social security cards. 84  Many, though not all, state
agencies, as well as the SSA, permit individuals to change
the gender marker on their identity documents from male to
female or from female to male.85  However, the gender
reclassification procedures vary widely among agencies
with some requiring proof of sex reassignment surgery.
86
As a result, an individual could, for example, change the
gender marker on his or her driver's license as well as the
gender marker associated with his or her social security
card, but maintain the original gender marker on his or her
birth certificate. In such a scenario, the person's "legal
gender" would remain unclear.
87
83 Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 750-51
(2008).
84 id. at 760-74.
85 Id. at 767-70:
Forty-seven states and New York City allow gender
reclassification on birth certificates. Idaho, Ohio, and
Tennessee will not change gender on a birth certificate.
Twenty-eight states plus the District of Columbia and New
York City specifically authorize gender reclassification by
statute or administrative ruling, while the other nineteen have
no written rule stating that they allow sex designation change,
but in practice do provide sex designation change upon
application.
Id. at 767-68 (citations omitted).
86 Id. at 768-70. For example, New York requires that the applicant
has undergone penectomy or hysterectomy and mastectomy. Id. at 769.
87 Id. at 734:
Many people are under the impression that everyone has a
clear 'legal gender' on record with the government, and that
18
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Thus, the plaintiff in Lopez might have changed her
gender marker from male to female on all of her identity
documents, including her birth certificate, driver's license,
and social security card. If that were the case, would the
defendant still have considered her female presentation a
misrepresentation given that her assigned sex was male?
Alternatively, the plaintiff in Lopez might have changed her
gender marker from male to female on some, but not all, of
her identity documents. If that were the case, might the
defendant have considered her gender presentation a
misrepresentation regardless of whether her presentation
was stereotypically male or female?
Even if the plaintiff in Lopez had changed the
gender markers on her identity documents from male to
female, neither the defendant nor the court discussed
whether the plaintiff should have disclosed her assigned sex
or the sex that appeared on her identity documents (or
perhaps on the majority of her identity documents in the
event that they contained different gender markers). In
light of the various gender reclassification policies in the
United States, the Lopez defendant's statement regarding
the plaintiff's status as a male seems oversimplified and its
characterization of her female presentation as a
misrepresentation somewhat illogical.
B. "Inappropriate Conversations"
Like the defendant in Lopez, the defendant in
Sturchio v. Ridge asserted a similarly suspect legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action it took
changing 'legal gender' involves presenting some kind of
evidence to a specific agency or institution in order to make a
decisive and clear change to the new category .... As it turns
out, the reality of the rules that govern gender reclassification
in the United States is far more complex.
Id.
88 See Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 656.
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against a trans employee. 89 The plaintiff in Sturchio, a trans
woman named Tracy Nicole Sturchio, had worked for the
United States Border Patrol as a telecommunications
specialist for about eleven years before she transitioned to
female. As she began changing her appearance, Sturchio
occasionally discussed her gender presentation with co-
workers.
91
Some of her co-workers felt uncomfortable
discussing gender matters with Sturchio and complained to
management.9 2  United States Border Patrol supervisors
took various disciplinary actions against Sturchio and
instructed her not to discuss her appearance or any gender-
related issues with her co-workers.93 Sturchio may not
have been an exemplary employee. In fact, some evidence
suggests that Sturchio talked too much while working and
that she repeatedly told co-workers a seemingly outlandish,
and likely false, story about how a government doctor said
she would "turn into a woman" because she had
accidentally been exposed to "military estrogen."
94
Regardless, the defendant's trial brief and the
court's opinion in Sturchio strongly suggest that the United
States Border Patrol ultimately took adverse employment
action against the plaintiff, not because she talked too much
or told falsehoods, but because she initiated so-called
"inappropriate conversations" regarding her gender and
subsequently caused discomfort among her co-workers.
95
89 Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-RHW, 2005 WL 1502899 at *6,
16 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005).
9 Id. at *1, 3-4.




95 See Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *3, 15-16; see also KATE
BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF US
10 (1994) (noting that "gender identity seems to be an unspeakable
thing in our culture"). Bornstein further explains: "In this culture, the
20
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For example, Sturchio asked one female co-worker for hair
and makeup advice. 96 On another occasion, Sturchio told a
co-worker about an instance where Sturchio had visited a
waterslide park with her family and did not know which
restroom to use to change into her bathing suit.
97
Additionally, the defendant's trial brief stated that
another employee would testify that "[a]ll of a sudden with
no prompting and apropos of nothing, Sturchio started
talking about how he wears a dress, that people call him a
woman's name, and that people sometimes mistake him for
a woman, talking for about five minutes." 98  The
defendant's trial brief also indicated that another co-worker
would testify that "Sturchio made unsolicited comments
about... his accident [with military estrogen], his bra size,
having certain body parts cut off, that his estrogen patch
was not working and his hormones are not right."
99
Most of the employees who said that they felt
uncomfortable during conversations with Sturchio seemed
primarily uncomfortable with Sturchio's gender transition
as a general matter, rather than with any specific comments
that an employer might consider inappropriate or offensive
independent of an employee's gender transition.100 The
defendant's trial brief states that one United States Border
Patrol employee "was very religious, and Sturchio's
comments made him uncomfortable."' 0  Another employee
only two sanctioned gender clubs are 'men' and 'women.' If you don't
belong to one or the other, you're told in no uncertain terms to sign up
fast." Id. at 24. "Then there's gender attribution, whereby we look at
somebody and say, 'that's a man,' or 'that's a woman.' And this is
important because the way we perceive another's gender affects the
way we relate to that person." Id. at 26.
96 Defendant's Trial Brief at 6, Sturchio v. Ridge, No. CV-03-0025-
RHW, 2005 WL 1502899 (E.D. Wash. June 23, 2005).
9' Id. at 9.
98 Id. at 11.
I ld. at 21.
'o See id. at6,9, 11, 15, 19.
o Id. at 19.
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noted that "he could have a problem if he had to work with
Sturchio on a regular basis, because Sturchio's appearance
would take some getting used to."' 10 2 Others expressed
concern regarding whether the defendant employer would
permit Sturchio to use the women's restroom.10 3 These
comments illustrate that many employees who complained
about the conversations they had with Sturchio were simply
uncomfortable with her new gender presentation.
The Sturchio court's opinion further demonstrated
that the United States Border Patrol employees who felt
uncomfortable during conversations with Sturchio were
simply uncomfortable with Sturchio's gender transition and
perhaps trans individuals in general. For example, the
court stated: "Understandably, the discomfort was caused
because the subject was too intimate for the type of
relationship between [Sturchio] and the coworker, or it was
interpreted as inappropriate because of the coworker's
belief system."' 0 5 The court further stated: "Testimony
revealed that many of his coworkers were uncomfortable in
discussing Plaintiff's appearance with him. In our society,
most people relate to others under the assumption that they
are who they appear to be, i.e., male or female, and content
to be so."' 6  The court said that the employees'
"discomfort was understandable, given the topic of
discussion, the environment in which it was being spoken,
and the fact that the coworkers were receiving mixed
signals regarding [Sturchio's] gender identity.'
10 7
The court's statements regarding Sturchio's gender,
and gender in general, suggest that the defendant took
adverse action against Sturchio because she is trans or
102 Id. at 21.
103 See id. at 6.
104 See Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *3.
105 id.
106 Id. (emphasis added).
107 id.
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otherwise because she failed to conform to its gender
norms. Yet, the court in Sturchio held that the adverse
action taken by the defendant against Sturchio was not
based on Sturchio's "failure to act or look in the way
expected of a man."'10 8  The court's conclusion is
incomprehensible given the court's poignant discussion of
appropriate gender behavior and the statements of
Sturchio's co-workers regarding their discomfort
surrounding Sturchio's diverse gender presentation.
For the most part, the "inappropriate conversations"
in Sturchio merely involved non-sexual aspects of
Sturchio's gender transition or otherwise related to
Sturchio's new gender expression.l°9 The court's
acceptance of these so-called inappropriate conversations
as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to take adverse
employment action against a trans worker'' 0 places
significant burdens on trans people in violation of Title VII.
Gender is an integral part of every person's identity.' For
a trans individual, gender can have even more
significance. 112
108 Id. at * 13.
109 See id. at *15.
110 See id.
"' "Each person's self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is
integral to their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-
determination, dignity and freedom." THE YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES
ON THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN
RELATION TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY 11 (2007),
http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles-en.pdf.
112 See SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 1 (2004):
I use [transgender] in this book to refer to people who move
away from the gender they were assigned at birth, people who
cross over (trans-) the boundaries constructed by their culture
to define and contain that gender. Some people move away
from their birth-assigned gender because they feel strongly
that they properly belong to another gender in which it would
be better for them to live; others want to strike out toward
some new location, some space not yet clearly defined or
concretely occupied; still others simply feel the need to get
23
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Stifling conversations related to gender for a trans
individual, but not for a cis individual, is discriminatory
and doing so creates an unwelcome or even hostile
environment for gender-variant people and people who
transition from one gender to another. In this type of
environment, trans people lose employment opportunities
while cis people who engage in gender-appropriate
conversations do not. Furthermore, state and federal
employers, like the United States Border Patrol, may
violate their employees' First Amendment right of free
speech when they prohibit workplace conversations.'
13
C. "Potential Liability"
In Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit assumed,
without deciding, that the plaintiff could establish a prima
facie case of sex discrimination under the Price Waterhouse
sex stereotyping theory. 14 When the plaintiff in Etsitty,
Krystal Etsitty, was hired by the defendant, Utah Transit
Authority, as a bus driver, she presented as male and used
male restrooms on her bus route. 1 15 Utah Transit Authority
terminated Etsitty shortly after she began presenting as
female and using female restrooms. 116 Etsitty filed a Title
VII sex discrimination claim." 7  Because the court
assumed that the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case
of sex discrimination, the burden shifted to the defendant
away from the conventional expectations bound up with the
gender that was initially put on them.
113 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
114 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 (10th Cir.
2007).
15 Id. at 1218-19.
116 Id. at 1219
117 id.
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"to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its
decision to discharge the plaintiff." 18
The defendant, Utah Transit Authority, stated that it
terminated Etsitty's employment solely because she
planned to use female restrooms along her bus route even
though she was a biological male.' 19 The defendant said it
was concerned that a biological male's use of a female
restroom would result in liability for the defendant.120 The
court agreed that the defendant's articulated reason for
Etsitty's termination constituted a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for purposes of Title VII. 121
The court's unfortunate decision in Etsitty conflicts
with well-established employment discrimination law
principles. The Supreme Court has already determined that
an employer cannot discriminate against an employee in
violation of Title VII simply because the employer fears the
remote possibility of liability.122 In Automobile Workers v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., the defendant employer, a battery
manufacturer, barred all fertile women from jobs involving
lead exposure in an effort to avoid liability for harm caused
to unborn children whose mothers were exposed to lead.
123
The Court held that the employer's policy violated Title
VII. 124 First, the Court noted that the bases suggested for
holding the employer liable for harm caused to unborn
children were weak.125  The Court stated that the
8 Id. at 1224.
119 Id. at 1224-25.
120 Id. at 1224.
121 Id. at 1227.
122 See Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 192
(1991); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009)
(holding that an employer must have a "strong basis in evidence" to
believe that it will be subject to disparate impact liability before it can
"engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of
avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact").
123 499 U.S. 187, 192 (1991).
124 Id. at 206.
125 Id. at 208.
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defendant's "speculation [regarding liability] appears
unfounded as well as premature."'
' 26
Second, and most importantly, the Court stated that
the employer in Johnson Controls "attempt[ed] to solve the
problem of reproductive health hazards by resorting to an
exclusionary policy."' 27  As the Court stated, "Title VII
plainly forbids illegal sex discrimination as a method of
diverting attention from an employer's obligation to police
the workplace."' 28 In other words, employers cannot evade
their Title VII obligations by arguing that it is simply too
difficult or costly to avoid discriminating against female
workers.
As in Johnson Controls, no real basis for liability
exists in the Etsitty case. As an initial matter, it is generally
lawful for trans women to use female-designated restrooms.
In fact, some cities have guidelines or regulations that
require or strongly encourage public entities, including
employers, not to discriminate against trans people by
denying them access to restrooms that reflect their gender
identities or expressions. 29 Furthermore, courts that have
addressed the issue of restroom discrimination have held
that because employers need not fear liability when trans
126 Id. at 210.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See District of Columbia Regulations, Compliance Rules and
Regulations Regarding Gender Identity or Expression, § 801(a), (c),
available at http://newsroom.dc.gov/file.aspx/release/10121/
FinalTransgender.Regulations.pdf. The D.C. regulations state that
unlawful discriminatory practices shall include denying access to
restrooms and other gender-specific facilities that are consistent with
the employee's gender identity or expression in both the employment
and public accommodations contexts. See also New York City
Guidelines, Guidelines Regarding "Gender Identity" Discrimination, A
Form of Discrimination Prohibited by the New York City Human
Rights Law; San Francisco Regulations, San Francisco Compliance
Rules and Regulations Regarding Gender Identity Discrimination.
26
6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 72
130women use female-designated restrooms, it follows that
all public entities need not fear liability when trans people
use restrooms that match their gender identities or
expressions.
In Cruzan v. Special School District, No. 1, the
plaintiff, a cis woman and teacher, filed sex and religious
discrimination claims against her employer based on the
school's policy to allow trans women to use the female-
designated restrooms.1 31  The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that the school's policy did not create a
hostile work environment for cis women. 132 The Cruzan
court stated that "no case law supports [the plaintiff's]
assertion" that "reasonable [cis] women could.., find their
working environment is abusive or hostile when they must
share bathroom facilities with a coworker who self-
identifies as female, but who may be biologically male."'
' 33
The court's discussion in Cruzan reveals the defects in
Utah Transit Authority's argument that it feared liability
based on the plaintiff's use of female-designated restrooms.
Most importantly, the court's acceptance of the
defendant's dubious liability theory as a legitimate reason
to take adverse action against a trans worker will drastically
erode employment opportunities for trans people. The
Etsitty court seemed to rely heavily on the defendant's
distinction between the plaintiff's use of public, off-site
restrooms, which the defendant argued it could not
accommodate, and the plaintiff's use of on-site restrooms,
which presumably the defendant may have been able to
130 Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., No. 1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir.
2002). "We agree with the district court that Cruzan [the plaintiff]
failed to show the school district's policy allowing [the trans school
teacher] to use the women's faculty restroom created a working
environment that rose to this level." Id.
131 Id. at 982-83.
132 Id. at 984.
133 id.
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accommodate. 134  The defendant and the court were
concerned about liability that may result from "public
complaints.' 35
Though one could argue that the Etsitty court
limited its decision to off-site public restrooms, a future
defendant employer could certainly argue that it may
lawfully discharge a trans woman where she plans to use an
on-site restroom either open to the public or used by
customers and clients. The same potential for complaints
exists in both cases. Contrary to the purpose of Title VII,
the Etsitty decision encourages employers to wholly
exclude trans people from their workplaces. 36  As the
Court stated in Johnson Controls, exclusionary policies
stand in direct opposition to the anti-discrimination laws. 1
37
IV. "Legitimate" Reasons to Discriminate?
The so-called "legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons" asserted against the trans plaintiffs in Lopez,
Sturchio, and Etsitty are actually quite discriminatory and
therefore not legitimate reasons to take adverse
employment action against trans applicants and workers.
In fact, the reasons proffered by the defendants in these
cases constitute direct evidence of employment
discrimination. Direct evidence includes "'evidence of
' Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1219.
115 Id. at 1227.
136 Id. at 1225. "The record also reveals UTA believed, and Etsitty has
not demonstrated otherwise, that it was not possible to accommodate
her bathroom usage . . . ." Id. at 1224. See also BORNSTEIN, supra
note 95, at 102 (describing "either/or" as a control mechanism).
'Ladies' are the kind of people who won't let my girlfriend use
the public ladies' room, thinking she's not a woman. Oh, but
they're not going to let her use the men's room either-they're
not going to let her be a man either. If she's not a man, and
she's not a woman, then what is she?"
Id. (quoting Holly Hughes, Clit Notes, 1993).
137 Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 210.
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conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision
making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting
the alleged discriminatory attitude."" 38  The reasons
proffered by the defendants in these cases strongly reflect
their "discriminatory attitude[s]" toward trans people.
A discussion of direct evidence cited in other types
of employment discrimination cases may shed some light
on the proposition that the "legitimate, non-discriminatory"
reasons articulated by the defendants merely reflect their
discriminatory attitudes toward trans people rather than
their legitimate exercises of employer discretion. "Direct
evidence" of discrimination typically consists of statements
that reveal a belief on the part of the employer that a
particular type of person is generally not viable as an
employee. 139 In an age discrimination case, for example,
the direct evidence presented will likely reflect the
employer's belief that older individuals are not viable
employees.
In Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Cos., an
age discrimination case, the defendant's agent, a senior
regional vice president for the company, stated that the
defendant should not have hired two older individuals
because "they should have been, or should have remained,
retired." 140 The vice president further stated that a 64-year-
old employee "can't... be superior" and that "there is no
138 Morgan v. A.G Edwards & Sons, Inc., 486 F3d 1034, 1043 (8th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444,
449 (8th Cir. 1993)).
139 Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir.
1992) (discussing employer's discriminatory statements, including:
"[Plaintiff is] not the type of person that we want to hire.... [T]hat guy
should have retired years ago."); Jerge v. City of Hemphill, Texas, 80 F.
App'x 347, 350 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing statements by plaintiff's
supervisor that she "lacked the 'nuts' for the job" and that "the
community would never accept a woman as City Manager").
140 Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 183.
29
6:1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 75
way [a 60-year-old employee] can contribute. '  The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the vice
president's statements, which reflected his "discriminatory
attitude" toward older individuals, constituted direct
evidence of age discrimination. 142 The evidence presented
reflected the vice president's belief that the older
individuals were not viable employees due to their age.
Similarly, in Jerge v. City of Hemphill, a sex
discrimination case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the plaintiff presented direct evidence of
sex discrimination where the evidence reflected the
defendant's discriminatory attitude toward women and
more specifically the defendant's belief that women are not
viable employees. 14 3 The plaintiff in Jerge filed a sex
discrimination suit after the city's mayor and councilmen
failed to appoint her City Manager. 144  The evidence
showed that the mayor told the plaintiff that the councilmen
would not support her candidacy for City Manager because
they "don't think a woman can do the job."' 145  The
evidence further showed that one councilman "expressed
reservation as to whether the two women applicants could
handle the 'outside parts' of the job." ,46 Another
councilman stated that he was "concerned about a woman
being called out to work at night-one of the requirements
of the job of City Manager.',147 The court in Jerge held that
the evidence presented constituted direct evidence of
discrimination. The mayor and councilmen's statements
reflected their belief that a woman is not viable as a City
Manager.
14 Id. at 174.
142 Id. at 182-83.
143 Jerge, 80 F. App'x at 350.
'44 Id. at 349-50.
141 Id. at 349.
146 Id. at 351.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 350-5 1.
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Like the statements in Ostrowski and Jerge, the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reasons asserted by the
defendants in Lopez, Sturchio, and Etsitty constitute direct
evidence of discrimination because the reasons asserted
reflect the employers' discriminatory attitudes toward trans
people. Unlike the evidence in Ostrowski and Jerge,
however, the direct evidence in these cases more than
simply reflects the employers' belief that trans people are
not viable employees, although that particular belief is
implicit in the evidence presented. More significantly, the
statements strongly reflect the defendants' belief that trans
people are not viable as individuals in our society and thus
cannot possibly function appropriately within the
workplace. '49
For example, in Lopez, the defendant's articulation
of "gender misrepresentation" as the "legitimate, non-
discriminatory" reason for its failure to hire the plaintiff
reflects, at a minimum, the decision maker's belief that a
person who transitions from one gender to the other
affirmatively lies when he or she presents as his or her
affirmed gender. This suggests that the trans individual's
identity is fraudulent. The employer in Lopez essentially
suggests that the plaintiff does not exist as a woman and
thus cannot function properly in a workplace where the
employer must, among other things, "note [its] employees'
sex on healthcare benefits forms."' 50 The employer's belief
149 See STRYKER, supra note 105, at 6 (2004) ("Because most people
have great difficulty recognizing the humanity of another person if they
cannot recognize that person's gender, the gender-changing person can
evoke in others a primordial fear of monstrosity, or loss of
humaneness.").
150 Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 664 n.15. See also Dean Spade, Trans
Formation, Los ANGELES LAWYER, at 36 (Oct. 9, 2008) (describing the
myth that trans people do not exist and stating:
[t]his belief that transgender people's gender identities are
fraudulent or false and that legal obstacles to articulating such
an identity publicly should be upheld by judges is based in a
31
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regarding the plaintiff's viability as a female employee
strongly reflects its "discriminatory attitude" toward trans
people.
Similarly, in Sturchio, the defendant's articulation of
"inappropriate conversations" regarding gender as the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for the adverse
employment action taken against the plaintiff reflects the
defendant's beliefs that a trans woman is essentially a man
and that it is "inappropriate" for men to discuss certain
topics, such as makeup and hair styles.' 5' The employer's
statements in Sturchio also show the employer's general
discomfort with gender transitions. The employer's
discomfort reflects the employer's belief that gender
transitions are objectionable and perhaps incompatible with
a healthy workplace. These beliefs strongly reflect the
employer's "discriminatory attitude" toward trans people
and thus constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
Finally, in Etsitty, the employer's articulation of
potential liability for the plaintiff's restroom usage as a
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason for its decision to
discharge the plaintiff strongly reflects the employer's
belief that it is inappropriate for trans women to use the
women's restroom because trans women are essentially
men or because trans women are unnaturally non-
gendered.152 One of the plaintiff's supervisors stated in her
fundamental notion that birth-assigned gender is the only
"true" gender an individual can have and that transgender
identity is not recognizable or legitimate.
151 See STRYKER, supra note 111, at 10 ("Secondary sex characteristics
constitute perhaps the most socially significant part of morphology-
taken together, they are the bodily "signs" that others read to guess at
our sex, attribute gender to us, and assign us to the social category they
understand to be most appropriate for us.").
152 Diana Elkind, Comment, The Constitutional Implications of
Bathroom Access Based on Gender Identity: An Examination of Recent
Developments Paving the Way for the Next Frontier of Equal
Protection, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 921 (2007) ("As the
discrimination faced by the transgendered is often intrinsically tied to
32
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deposition testimony that she and another supervisor "both
felt that there was an image issue out there for us, that we
could have a problem with having someone who, even
though his appearance may look female, he's still a male
because he still had a penis.' 153 The court then stated that
"[i]mmediately after [the supervisor] mention[ed] Etsitty's
appearance, she explain[ed] the problem with this
appearance is that [Etsitty] may not be able to find a unisex
bathroom on the route and that liability may arise if Etsitty
was using female restrooms."
'' 54
The supervisor's statements in Etsitty reveal the
employer's belief that trans individuals are abnormally
gendered and that it is impractical, if not impossible, to
integrate trans people into a workplace-or a society-
where bathrooms, among other things, are gendered.
155
This belief on the part of the employer in Etsitty reflects its
view that trans people are not viable as individuals and thus
cannot function properly in society, let alone the workplace.
This belief strongly reflects the employer's "discriminatory
attitude" toward trans people and thus constitutes direct
evidence of discrimination.
In the typical employment discrimination case, the
"legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason asserted by the
their gender, which bathroom to use is a fundamental and unnecessarily
complicated choice that highlights the discord between the transgender
individual's personal identity and society's label of what is
acceptable.").
"' Etsitty, 502 F.3d at 1225 (emphasis added).
154 Id. at 1225-26.
155 See BORNSTEIN, supra note 95, at 45-52 (describing the rules of
gender, including there are two, and only two, genders; one's gender is
invariant; genitals are the essential sign of gender; any exceptions to
two genders are not to be take seriously; there are no transfers from one
gender to another except ceremonial ones; everyone must be classified
as a member of one gender or another; the male/female dichotomy is a
"natural" one; and membership in one gender or another is "natural")
(citing HAROLD GARFINKLE, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY
(1967)).
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employer for the adverse employment action taken against
the plaintiff is generally unrelated to the plaintiff's
protected characteristic. For example, the defendant in an
age discrimination case might assert that it discharged the
plaintiff because he or she was repeatedly late for work or
stole from the company. The employer in such a case
would probably not assert that it discharged the plaintiff, an
older individual, because his or her gray hair was
unprofessional or because he or she inappropriately
discussed dentures with other employees.
Yet, in discrimination cases with trans plaintiffs, the
so-called legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons asserted by
the defendants often relate directly to the plaintiff's
gender-his or her (claimed) protected characteristic.1
56
When the "legitimate, non-discriminatory" reason asserted
by the defendant relates directly to the plaintiff's protected
characteristic, the defendant's reason often reflects the
defendant's "discriminatory attitude" toward people with
the claimed protected characteristic. Most importantly, the
asserted reason often signals an employer's belief that a
person with the protected characteristic is not viable as an
employee or even as an individual (as is, sadly, often the
case in discrimination cases with trans plaintiffs). If the
employer asserts a so-called non-discriminatory reason that
essentially reflects its discriminatory attitude, the employer
may face legal consequences because the asserted non-
discriminatory reason constitutes direct evidence of
discrimination.
156 See, e.g., Lopez, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 656 (asserting gender
misrepresentation as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to rescind
job offer to a trans employee); Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 302
(asserting trustworthiness as a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to
rescind job offer to trans applicant); Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899 at *3
(asserting inappropriate conversations related to gender as a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to take adverse employment
action against a trans employee).
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V. Recycled Frameworks
In most jurisdictions, trans plaintiffs struggle to
establish the prima facie case of sex discrimination under
Title VII. 157 Subsequently, the employer need not articulate
a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse
employment action taken against the trans individual.
Instead, the court quickly determines that the law simply
fails to protect the trans employee. 58 Nonetheless, the law
is changing. Courts have recently held that discrimination
against a trans individual constitutes discrimination based
on sex in violation of Title VII.'59  In this legal
environment, employers that fail to address their
discriminatory attitudes and practices toward trans people
risk serious legal consequences under Title VII.
Fortunately, employers seeking to avoid liability for
gender discrimination by creating trans-inclusive work
environments need not wait for the courts to hand down
trans-positive rulings or for the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue trans-focused
guidelines. Rather, state and federal case law, along with
the regulations issued by the EEOC in other contexts,
already offers some guidance for employers seeking to
157 Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 E3d 211, 223 (2d Cir. 2005)
(holding that trans plaintiff's Title VII claim based on gender
stereotyping must fail).
158 Id.
159 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004);
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F Supp. 2d 293, 307 (D.D.C. 2008). In
addition to the increased protection for trans employees under Title VII,
anti-discrimination statutes in twelve states and 103 localities expressly
prohibit employment discrimination against trans people. National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force, Scope of Explicitly Transgender-Inclusive
Anti-discrimination Laws, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/
reports/fact sheets/TI_antidisclaws 7 08.pdf (last visited December
15, 2008). The twelve states are California, Colorado, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington.
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comply with anti-discrimination laws. For example, the
EEOC has issued guidelines for employers to use during
the interviewing process.16  The guidelines assist hiring
officials in their efforts to avoid asking discriminatory
interview questions that may later serve as the basis for a
discrimination suit. In the face of legal uncertainty and
legislative inaction, employers that apply well-established
anti-discrimination frameworks to emerging trans
workplace issues can create trans-friendly workspaces and
better avoid the legal consequences of discriminatory
attitudes.
A. "Gender Misrepresentation"
The hiring part of the employment process offers
the employer unique opportunities to discriminate.
Interview questions or application materials that reflect the
employer's discriminatory attitude toward trans people
could serve as direct evidence of discrimination in a
subsequent Title VII suit. 161 As a general rule, employers
should not ask questions that relate to protected
characteristics, including sex. When an employer does not
try to ascertain information about a protected characteristic,
an applicant need not "misrepresent" in terms of the
protected characteristic. Massachusetts case law, coupled
with EEOC guidelines, on pregnancy-related inquiries
provides a useful framework.
In Lysak v. Seiler, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
established a useful framework for pre-employment
160 EEOC Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MAN. (BNA) 443:65 (1993); Enforcement Guidance on Pre-
Employment Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 8
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MAN. (BNA) 405:7191 (1995).
161 Barbano v. Madison County, 922 F.2d 139, 144-45 (2d Cir. 1990)
(discussing case where interviewer asked female applicant about her
childbearing plans and whether her husband would approve of her
transporting male veterans as part of her job duties).
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inquiries based on protected characteristics. 62 The plaintiff
was pregnant when she interviewed for the defendant
company's marketing director position.' 63  During her
interview, she told the company's president "without any
solicitation.., that her husband stayed home and took care
of their two children with the help of an au pair and that
'she was not planning on having any more kids.'''164 After
she was hired, the plaintiff told the company's president
that she was pregnant; she knew at the time of her
interview that she was pregnant.165 The defendant demoted
the plaintiff because she had affirmatively lied during the
interview, and the plaintiff filed suit under the state anti-
discrimination law.166
The Lysak court held that an employer could not
take adverse employment action against an employee
because of the employee's false responses to the
employer's unlawful inquiries. 167 Thus, if the employer
had asked the plaintiff whether she was pregnant, and she
said that she was not pregnant, then the employer could not
take adverse action against her if the employer later
discovered that she was pregnant at the time of the
interview. However, an employer can take adverse action
against an employee where the employee or applicant
volunteers false statements without solicitation by the
employer. 68 Thus, because the plaintiff volunteered the
false statements regarding her plans for children without
solicitation by the employer, the Lysak court held that the
plaintiff had affirmatively lied to the defendant and that the
162 Lysak v. Seiler Corp., 614 N.E.2d 991 (Mass. 1993).
163 Id. at 992.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 991.
166 Id. at 993. Though the framework developed in Lysak is useful,
whether the Lysak plaintiff's statement actually constitutes a lie is
arF uable.
16 Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993.
168 Id.
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defendant could therefore take adverse employment action
against her based on the misrepresentation.' 
69
The Lysak court's framework for misrepresentations
regarding pregnancy provides some guidance to employers
for so-called misrepresentations regarding sex. EEOC
guidelines state that "[b]ecause Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on pregnancy, employers should not
make pregnancy-related inquiries."'' 70 In fact, "[t]he EEOC
will generally regard a pregnancy-related inquiry as
evidence of pregnancy discrimination where the employer
subsequently makes an unfavorable job decision affecting a
pregnant worker."'171 Similarly, because Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on sex and gender, employers should
not make sex- or gender-related inquiries, including
inquiries regarding whether the applicant or employee is
trans.
Thus, where the employer asks during an interview
whether the plaintiff is male or female, the employer cannot
take adverse action against the employee if the employer
later discovers that the employee provided affirmed sex
rather than assigned sex. Yet, if the applicant affirmatively
states, without solicitation, that the applicant's assigned sex
is male where the applicant's assigned sex is female, then
applying the Lysak framework, the employer may take
adverse action against the employee for the
misrepresentation. Employer assumptions regarding
assigned or legal gender based on an applicant's gender
presentation are not misrepresentations on the part of the
applicant, just as assumptions regarding pregnancy based
on whether an applicant appears pregnant are not
misrepresentations on the part of the applicant.
169 id.
170 EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of
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Accordingly, the employer in Lopez should not have
taken adverse employment action against the plaintiff when
it discovered that she was or had once been classified as
male. The plaintiff had not engaged in any misconduct
when she identified herself as female on an employment
application that unlawfully solicited the information. An
employer has "'no authority to discharge [an employee] for
giving false answers to questions that the [employer] under
law had no right to ask."",172  The Lopez employer's
argument that the trans plaintiff affirmatively
misrepresented her sex because she presented as female and
used a female name during the interview process equates to
an argument that a pregnant applicant affirmatively
misrepresents her pregnancy where she fails to appear
pregnant.
To summarize, an employer should not make sex-
related inquiries during the hiring process. More
importantly, where the employer solicits gender-related
information during the hiring process, the employer should
not take adverse employment action against an employee
after the employer discovers that the employee provided his
or her affirmed sex rather than assigned sex.
B. "Inappropriate Conversations"
Employers also permit discriminatory attitudes
throughout the workday. Prohibitions against particular
workplace speech, for example, may constitute
discrimination in violation of Title VII where the speech at
issue relates directly to a worker's protected characteristic.
172 Lysak, 614 N.E.2d at 993 (quoting Kraft v. Police Comm'r of
Boston, 571 N.E.2d 380 (1991)). This is not to say that a trans
individual provides a false answer where he or she provides his or her
affirmed sex rather than assigned sex on an employment application.
Rather, the phrase "false answer" should be interpreted as "legally
inaccurate" or "answer at odds with the employer's definition of sex or
gender."
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Courts have held that English-only workplace policies
violate Title VII's prohibition against discrimination based
on national origin because a close relationship exists
between language and national origin.173 The EEOC
Guidelines on English-only policies provide:
Speaking English-only rules.
(a) When applied at all times. A rule requiring
employees to speak only English at all times in the
workplace is a burdensome term and condition of
employment. The primary language of an
individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times,
in the workplace, from speaking their primary
language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual's
employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin. It may also create an atmosphere of
inferiority, isolation, and intimidation based on
national origin which could result in a
discriminatory working environment. Therefore,
the Commission will presume that such a rule
violates Title VII and will closely scrutinize it.
(b) When applied only at certain times. An
employer may have a rule requiring that
employees speak only in English at certain times
where the employer can show that the rule is
justified by business necessity. 1
74
Naturally, significant differences exist between
English-only policies and policies that prohibit trans
173 EEOC v. Premier Operator Servs, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1073 (N.D.
Tex. 2000).
174 29 C.FR. § 1606.7(a)-(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
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people's gender-related conversations. 175  However, both
policies operate to suppress the identities of the individuals
silenced by the policies. The English-only policies
subjugate the cultural or ethnic identities of employees
whose ethnic identities are disfavored by the employer.
176
Similarly, the restrictions on gender-related conversations
suppress the gender identities of trans employees, whose
gender identities the employer presumably disfavors.
In the average English-only policy case, the
employer typically defends its policy on the grounds that
non-English speakers create an uncomfortable working
environment for those who speak English only and thus
cannot comprehend the non-English speakers. 177 Similarly,
the employer in Sturchio argued that the trans employee's
gender-related conversations created an uncomfortable
work environment for other cis employees. 178 Given the
similarities between the English-only policy cases and the
Sturchio case, employers might adopt the EEOC Guidelines
175 Premier Operator Services, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (describing
"code-switching," where a bilingual person unconsciously switches
from one language to another, as impossible to restrain).
176 See Garcia v. Spun Steak, 13 E3d 296 (9th Cir. 2003).
Language is intimately tied to national origin and cultural
identity: its discriminatory suppression cannot be dismissed
as "inconvenience" to the affected employees. [ . .] Even
when an individual learns English and becomes assimilated
into American society, his native language remains an
important manifestation of his ethnic identity and a means of
affirming links to his original culture. English-only rules not
only symbolize a rejection of the excluded language and the
culture it embodies, but also a denial of that side of an
individual's personality.
Id. at 298 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
177 Long v. First Union Corp. of Virginia, 894 F. Supp. 933, 942 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (noting that defendant implemented English-only policy after
employees and supervisors complained that plaintiffs were making fun
of them in Spanish, which made them feel uncomfortable).
178 Sturchio, 2005 WL 1502899, at *3.
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on English-only rules as guidelines for gender identity-
related conversations as well.
Blanket prohibitions on conversations related to
gender transitions, gender identities, or gender
presentations and expressions place significant burdens on
trans workers especially when the prohibitions do not apply
to the gender-related conversations of cis workers. Most
importantly, the prohibitions "may also create an
atmosphere of inferiority, isolation, and intimidation" based
on gender identity or expression, "which could result in a
discriminatory working environment." 179 Though blanket
prohibitions are typically unnecessary and discriminatory,
employers can certainly prohibit gender-related
conversations "at certain times where the employer can
show the rule is justified by business necessity." Thus, in
Lopez, the employer should have prohibited the gender-
related conversations only "at certain times" when such a
prohibition was "justified by business necessity."'
180
The blanket prohibition, however, served only to
isolate the plaintiff from her cis co-workers and to create
the impression that the plaintiff's gender expression was
inferior to her cis co-workers' expressions. Before
employers silence trans employees in this manner, they
should consider whether business necessity justifies such
speech restrictions. Otherwise, a blanket prohibition on
gender-related conversations may reflect the employer's
discriminatory attitude toward trans people and thus
constitute direct evidence of discrimination.
C. Potential Liability
When creating a non-discriminatory workplace for
trans employees, employers seem to view the issue of
appropriate restroom access as the most difficult to address.
29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a) (2008).
I80 Id. § 1606.7(b).
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In the workplace and in the public sphere, bathrooms are
typically labeled either male or female. For whatever
reason, people often feel uncomfortable or alarmed when,
for example, an individual they perceive as male enters the
restroom labeled female. Creating a non-discriminatory
work environment for trans people may require more than
policy changes to an employee handbook. Rather, anti-
discrimination initiatives may require more significant
structural changes. Workplace reforms pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act may provide some useful
guidance.
The Americans with Disabilities Act requires
employers to make "reasonable accommodations" for
employees with disabilities.! 8  Courts have held that the
ADA requires employers to install handicap bathrooms,
build ramps, and lower sinks in the restrooms. 182 Though
the Americans with Disabilities Act specifically excludes
trans people from its coverage,' 83 employers who want to
prepare for an increasingly trans-inclusive legal
environment might consider preemptive structural changes
to restrooms to increase opportunities for trans people and
ultimately avoid liability for gender discrimination.
In "Integrating Accommodation," Professor
Elizabeth Emens posits that integrating people with
' 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)-(9) (2000).
182 See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 652 (2d Cir.1982).
In the context of public transportation and the
handicapped, denial of access cannot be lessened
simply by eliminating discriminatory selection
criteria; because the barriers to equal participation are
physical rather than abstract, some sort of action must
be taken to remove them, if only in the area of new
construction or purchasing. As plaintiffs pointedly
observe, "It is not enough to open the door for the
handicapped ... ; a ramp must be built so the door
can be reached."
Id.
183 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2000).
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disabilities into the workplace also means integrating
accommodations. 1 84 She argues that workplace
accommodations for disabled people provide third-party
usage benefits and attitudinal benefits, in addition to the
individual benefits to the disabled person or to the people
who sought the accommodation. 85 To illustrate the
potential for third-party usage benefits, Professor Emens
states:
Design matters. An employee whose disability
requires her to work from home for periods of
time could be accommodated by periodically
reassigning her tasks to a coworker, creating added
burdens for the coworker. Or, alternatively, her
accommodation request could lead her employer
to create a broad-based telecommuting initiative
that benefits multiple employees who wish to
work from home. 1 
86
Interestingly, structural changes in the form of
restroom accommodations intended to benefit trans
employees could provide similar third-party usage benefits
for cis employees and customers. For example, gender-
neutral bathrooms would likely provide usage benefits to a
wheelchair user who requires the assistance of his or her
opposite-sex partner in a restroom, a woman standing in a
long line outside the female-designated restroom while no
line exists outside the male-designated restroom, and a
parent tending an opposite-sex child when the parent or the
child suddenly needs to use a restroom in a movie
theater. 
87
184 Elizabeth Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
839, 843 (2008).
185 Id. at 848.
186 Id. at 841-42.
187 Terry Kogan, Sex Separation in Public Restrooms: Law,
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Professor Emens also discusses the attitudinal
benefits that flow from workplace accommodations for
disabled people. Attitudinal benefits in the disability
context involve benefits that change attitudes about
disabled people. 188  Similarly, structural changes to
restrooms in the workplace could produce attitudinal
benefits, including improvements in co-worker and
supervisor attitudes toward trans employees. Where an
employer integrates accommodations, the employer may
discover that cis employees no longer perceive trans
employees as "mysterious others" who do not belong in
either male- or female-designated bathrooms. Thus, the
attitudinal benefits of integrating accommodations for trans
employees include improving or eliminating the
discriminatory attitudes that often lead to costly litigation.
VI. Conclusion
Both employers, as potential defendants, and
judges, as potential decision-makers, should recognize that
purportedly legitimate employer policies and practices may
actually discriminate against trans employees in violation
of Title VII. In this article, I examined three "legitimate,
non-discriminatory" reasons that employers have asserted
for their decisions to take adverse employment action
Architecture, and Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 3-4 (2007)
(using these examples to illustrate situations where a gendered
bathroom is not the obvious choice).
188 See Emens, supra note 183, at 885:
[Integrating not only people with disabilities, but also
disability accommodations, can change the culture in ways
that are consistent with the inclusionary purposes of the ADA.
In particular, designing accommodations with an eye to their
benefits for third parties may help improve attitudes toward
disability and the ADA. These attitudinal benefits may arise
through three routes: (1) improved "contact," (2) positive
associations, and (3) increased uptake of the social model.
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against trans employees, including gender
misrepresentation, inappropriate conversations related to
gender, and potential liability for bathroom usage. I argued
that judicial acceptance of these reasons as legitimate and
non-discriminatory would severely limit employment
opportunities for trans people and would undercut well-
established employment law principles.
Furthermore, the reasons asserted by the employers
suggest that trans people are not viable as employees and
therefore reflect the discriminatory attitudes of the
decision-makers toward trans people. Where the asserted
reasons reflect the discriminatory attitudes of the
employers, the reasons constitute direct evidence of
discrimination. Finally, in light of recent trans-positive
federal case law, employers should consider the ways in
which they can create trans-inclusive workplaces.
Employers that try to avoid liability by pandering to the
biases and discriminatory attitudes of the decision-makers
rather than by actually preventing discrimination risk the
very real possibility that the decision-makers will discern
the true nature of their assertions and refuse to accept them
as legitimate and non-discriminatory.
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